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INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 1990, the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act'
(AWCPA) became law. The United States, for the first time, provided copyright
protection for architectural structures. This new law established certain property
rights in architectural designs, enabling architects to better control exploitation of their
works.2 Generally, the AWCPA provides architects with the exclusive right to
reproduce or alter their copyrighted works.3 Furthermore, the AWCPA brings the
United States closer to full compliance with its obligations stemming from the
international copyright treaty known as the Berne Convention
The AWCPA, however, affords only limited protection for architectural structures.'
The Act's provisions require the architect to surrender to the building's owner the right
to alter or destroy the work.' Moreover, the public retains the right to make pictorial
representations of the architect's work.7 This article argues that the architect's
copyright should include the exclusive right to make or authorize pictorial
representations of architectural works. Congress should amend the AWCPA to better
protect this valuable form of art8 while simultaneously taking another step toward full
1. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 701,703,
104 Stat 5128,5133 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., including §§ 101(5),
102(aX8), 120 (Supp. H 1990)).
2. See infra notes 19-23, 31 and accompanying text (defining copyright as bundle of
property rights).
3. See infra notes 117-152 and accompanying text (discussing architecfs rights under
AWCPA).
4. See infra notes 184-194 and accompanying text (discussing United States compliance
with intemational law obligations arising from Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, September 9,1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Revision, July 24, 1971)). On
October 31, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 120 (Supp. H 1990) (defining scope of exclusive rights in architectural
works); see also id. § 101 (defining "Architectural Work"). An "architectural work" is the
design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building,
architectural plans, or drawings. Id. The work includes the overall form as well as the
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include
individual standard features. Id.
6. Id. § 120(b). The owner of a building embodying an architectural work may, without the
consent of the copyright owner, make or authorize the making of alterations to the building. Id.
The owner may also destroy or authorize the destruction of the building. Id.
7. Id. § 120(a). The copyright in a constructed architectural work does not include the right
to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other
pictorial representations ofthe work. Id. This exception applies only if the building embodying
the work is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-650, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 6936. Congress
determined that architecture is a form of artistic expression that performs a significant societal
purpose, both domestically and internationally. Id. See also Raphael Winick, Copyright
Protectionfor Architecture After the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990,
41 DuKE L. J. 1598, 1599-1600 (1992) (discussing architecture's importance as art form).
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/2
1996] ARCH. WORKS COPYRIGHTACT 3
Beme Convention compliance.
Part I of this article discusses the background of the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act, including the historical treatment of architectural works in the United
States. It also highlights the United States' responsibilities under the Berne
Convention. Part II comments on the current state of copyright law, focusing on the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act and its treatment of derivative works.
Part III analyzes the shortcomings of existing copyright protection and offers possible
solutions.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ARCHITECTURAL WORKS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ACT
A. A Historical Overview of United States Copyright Law
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, twelve of the thirteen states in the
Union provided statutory copyright protection for authors within their respective
states? In an attempt to promote literary and graphic arts,"' the individual state laws
secured authors" the exclusive right to make and distribute copies of their work
product. 2 These laws, however, failed to provide authors adequate protection for their
creations for two reasons.'3 First, the individual laws were unenforceable beyond a
state's jurisdiction." Second, there was no uniformity among state lawR These
9. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NiNETIEs 5 (4th ed.
1993) [hereinafter GORMAN & GINSBURG]. Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina and Virginia all had copyright laws by 1787, with only Delaware failing to provide
statutory protection for authors. Id. See generally Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the
U.S. Constitution: Why did the Framers Include It With Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 361 (1992) (discussing purposes for copyright clause in United States
Constitution).
10. See Donner, supra note 9, at 369 (discussing individual copyright laws of original
states).
11. For copyright purposes, the term "author" generally refers to the creator of a
copyrightable work, be it written, graphic or sculptural. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (holding author is party who translates idea into
fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486,1492 (1 th Cir. 1990) (defining architect as author of architectural
drawings).
12. See James Bingham Bucher, Reinforcing the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Works ofArchitecture, 39 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1264 (1990) (stating traditional
purpose of copyright law is to encourage creativity by granting exclusive economic rights).
13. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing difference between property
rights and moral rights); see also Todd Hixon, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act of 1990: At Odds With the Traditional Limitations ofAmerican Copyright Law, 37 APrz.
L. REv. 629, 639 (1995) (stating that inconsistencies in several states' copyright statutes
required federal copyright legislation).
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limitations forced authors to obtain a copyright for their works in each of the individual
states. "'6 The authors' only alternatives were-to either distribute the work in only one
state or forego copyright protection entirely. 7
Recognizing that national legislation would eliminate this deficiency, the
Constitutional Convention empowered Congress to enact federal copyright
legislation.1 8 The Constitution's framers intended to benefit the public by granting
authors a uniform but limited monopoly in their works.1 9 The limited monopoly served
as incentive to motivate the authors' creativity by providing them with a financial
reward. The public would then benefit from free access to the authors' creative genius
after the authors' limited period of exclusive control had expired. To this end,
copyright is a means to protect authors, for a limited time, against unauthorized use of
the product oftheir labors.2" Because copyright is for the public's benefit 2 Congress
and the courts have allowed authors only property rights in their works.22
16. Id. at 365.
17. Id. at 363.
18. Id. at 361. The Constitutional Convention unanimously approved this measure. Id. See
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power to promote progress of useful arts
by securing authors exclusive rights in their writings).
19. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984)
(discussing monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize under Article I of U.S.
Constitution).
20. See Winick, supra note 8, at 1603 (discussing reasons for providing copyright
protection).
21. See id. at 1601 (providing constitutional purposes of U.S. copyright law); see, e.g.,
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (holding limited scope of
copyright monopoly reflects balance of competing claims upon public interest; private artistic
motivation must serve to promote public availability of useful arts); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201,219 (1954) (holding that copyright law makes reward to owner secondary consideration);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (holding that primary object of copyright
monopoly lies in general benefits public derives from labors of authors). Copyright is given by
the public for benefits bestowed upon it by the skill of individuals, and as incentive to further
their efforts for those benefits. Id.
22. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1907), reprinted in OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Riorrs IN Tim AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 38 (1986). The Legislative Committee's report on the 1907
Act stated that U.S. copyright legislation is not based on any natural right that the author has in
her writings. Id.
The Supreme Court has held that copyright is purely a statutory right. See, e.g., Dowling v.
United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217 (1985) (holding that infringement of statutorily defined
property rights of copyright holder implicates complex set of property interests); Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 401 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating that in "exercise of its power 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,'
Congress, by granting copyrights, has created valuable property rights"); American Tobacco Co.
v. Werekrneister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907) (holding that object of United States' statutes is to
secure and protect nature of property rights in copyright).
Although the Beme Convention text recognizes the author's moral rights, see infra notes 75-
92 and accompanying text, in ratifying the treaty, Congress in no way accepted the idea of moral
rights. See S. REP No. 352, 100th Cong., 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,
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Additionally, Congress has limited the author's monopoly by statutorily regulating the
duration of those property rights.'
B. Copyright Protection Under the 1976 Copyright Act
Beginning with the 1790 Copyright Act,2" Congress has consistently provided
authors with property rights in their original works.' Initially protecting little more
3715 (stating that adherence to Berne Convention not intended to change status quo regarding
moral rights). However, the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 represented
movement towards the recognition of moral rights under United States copyright law. See
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(granting visual artists moral rights, including right of paternity and right of integrity); see also
William Belanger, Article: U.S. Compliance With the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON IND.
L. REv. 373,373-76 (1995) (discussing history of U.S. copyright law); Hixon, supra note 13,
at 639-40 (discussing historical purposes for copyright law in United States); Winick, supra note
8, at 1599-1604 (discussing historical purposes and background of U.S. copyright law).
23. Hixon, supra note 13, at 640. For example, the first copyright statute limited the
author's monopoly to a fourteen-year period, with the privilege of renewing for another fourteen
years. Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. Congress then extended the term to twenty-eight years, with
a twenty-eight-year extension. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Currently, the
autho's monopoly is generally limited to the life of the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302
(1988).
24. Act of 1790,1 Stat. 124 (quoted in Hixon, supra note 13, at 643 n.91). The 1790 Act
provided "for the encouragement of learning, by securing copies of maps, charts, and books, to
the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned." Id.
25. Act of May31, 1790, ch. 15,1 Stat. 124. The Copyright Act enacted in 1790 protected
only literay works, maps and charts. Id. In 1802 Congress amended the Act, adding prints to
the list of protected subject matter. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
The 1802 expansion of American copyright law was but the first of many legislative actions
granting, qualifying, expanding and restricting copyright protection. Id. In 1831 Congress
broadened the scope of protection granted in the original Copyright Act of 1790 by including
musical compositions. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch.16, 4 Stat. 436. The 1831 Act also expanded
the term of protection to 28 years with the privilege of renewal. Id. In 1870, another
amendment to the 1790 Act added copyright protection for models or designs intended to be
perfected as works of the fine arts. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 212. This
amendment also granted copyright owners the exclusive right to complete, copy, execute, finish,
and vend the work. Id. In 1909, the legislature substantially changed the scope of copyright
protection. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, oh. 301,35 Stat. 1075. The 1909 Act substituted "works of
art" for "Fine arts," again expanding copyright protection. Id. The 1909 Act protected works
of art, models, or designs for work of art and protected drawings or plastic works of a scientific
or technical character. Id. at § 5.
Congress first amended the Copyright Act of 1909 with the Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 356,
37 Stat. 488, rendering motion pictures expressly copyrightable, and again in 1939, to protect
prints and labels used for merchandise. Act of July 31, 1939, 53 Stat. 1142. Finally, in 1971
Congress again amended the 1909 Act by the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, which
provided limited protection to sound recordings. Id. The Act of 1909, as amended, remained
in effect through 1977, and governs pre-1978 causes of action. Act of October 15, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
5
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than literary works,26 United States copyright law has continuously evolved to reflect
the world's economic changes and technological advancements." Although the
Copyright Act of 1909' still controls certain rights,"' the Copyright Act of 197630 and
its subsequent amendments currently define copyright protection.
The 1976 Act generally affords the copyright owner3' five exclusive privileges.32
The Act provides an artist with the exclusive right to distribute an original work, copy
an original work33 and make similar (derivative) works based upon that work.34 It also
grants an artist the exclusive right to authorize public display of the work and to
Congress enacted the current Copyright Act in 1976. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553,90 Stat 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Amendments
to the current Act include the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, § 10, Pub. L. No.
96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (extending protection to computer software); the Record Rental
Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (amended 1988) (regulating
compulsory jukebox licenses); the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853; the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, Title
IZ section 201, Nov. 16,1988, 102 Stat 3949; the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VIII, 104 Stat. 5089; the Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650,tit VI, 104 Stat 5089; the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act,
Dec. 1,1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VIL 104 Stat. 5089; the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4248; and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304.
26. Act of May31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. The 1790 Act offered authors protection for
only original maps, charts, and books. Id.
27. See GoRMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing concept of copyright from
historical perspective).
28. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, reprinted in 4 MELvILLE B. NID&ER &
DAVIDNIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 6 (1993) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
29. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b). For instance, the 1976 Act codifies judicial interpretation of the
1909 Act and does not find infringement in the plans of a structure through the unauthorized
construction of a substantially similar building. 4 NIMnmR ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 28,
2.08(D), at 2-116 to -117.
30. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2451, reprinted in 4 NI&MER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 28, app. 2.
31. H.RREp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 1976, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5698.
The term "copyright owner" is used here because the enumerated rights create the "bundle of
rights" that is copyright Id. Each right may be subdivided, owned and enforced separately. Id.
32. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing differences between copyright
as "natural right" and as legislatively granted privilege). These privileges were essentially
inherited from the English Statute ofAnne. 8 Anne c. 19, 1710 (U.K.). This statute established
authors' exclusive right to print, reprint and distribute a new work. Id.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies, id., and to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. Id. § 106(3).
34. Id. § 106(2). The owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to prepare and
authorize derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. Id. A "derivative work" is a work
based on a preexisting work, such as a translation, dramatization, motion picture version, art
reproduction, or any other form in which one may recast, transform, or adapt a work. Id. § 101.
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authorize public performance of certain protected works.3" Congress and the courts,
however, have imposed various qualifications,36 exemptions, 7 and limitation? on
these privileges.
The judiciary has also influenced modem copyright law. The United States
Supreme Court" has established a fundamental rule of modem copyright lRw,
holding that copyright protection applies to only the expression of an idea and not to
the underlying idea itself.4 Furthermore, courts have interpreted this rule to support
another fundamental rule of copyright law: that copyright does not protect those
articles that have an intrinsic utilitarian function, otherwise known as "useful
articles."42
35. See ia § 106(4)-(5) (granting exclusive right to public performance and public display
of copyrighted work).
36. Id. § 113 (Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); id. § 114
(Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings); id. § 115 (Scope of exclusive rights in
nondramatic musical works: Compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords).
37. Id. § 116 (Negotiated licenses for public performances by means of coin-operated
phonorecord players); id. § 118 (Use of works in connection with noncommercial
broadcasting); id. § 120 (Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works).
38. Id. § 107 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use); id. § 108 (Limitations on exclusive
rights: Reproduction by libraries and archives); id. § 109 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect
of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord); id. § 110 (Limitations on exclusive rights:
Exemption of certain performances and displays); id. § 111 (Limitations on exclusive rights:
Secondary transmissions); id. § 112 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Ephemeral recordings);
id. § 117 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs); id. § 119 (Limitations on
exclusive rights: Secondary transmissions ofsuperstations and network stations for private home
viewing).
39. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The Court held that the author could copyright
a book on accounting principles, but the author could not copyright the accounting procedures
described therein. Id. at 104. Differentiating "practical applications" from "ornamental
designs," the Court defined the latter as "the product of genius and the result of composition,"
and the former as having "their final end in application and use." Id. at 103. The application
and use are what the public derive from the object. Id. at 103-04. The embodiment of the rules
and methods alone is what the copyright secures. The use by another of the same statements,
whether in words or illustrations, would be an infringement of the copyright. Id.
40. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)
(citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) for proposition that copyright protection applies to
expression of idea, not idea itself); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d
527,535 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Bell South Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Information
Pub., Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (same); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510,1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975
F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 706 (2nd Cir.
1991) (same).
41. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-04. There is a clear distinction between a book, as such, which
would be the subject of copyright, and the procedure that it illustrates, which is not. Id.
42. See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197,202-03 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding utilitarian features of calendar pages and address/telephone pages, not subject
to copyright protection); Brandir Intl, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-
47 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that although the sculpture which inspired the bicycle rack may be
7
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Currently, under the amended 1976 Act, a utilitarian or useful article" qualifies for
copyright protection as to its form, but not its mechanical or utilitarian aspects.4
Thus, a useful article may qualify for protection only if the article's design can exist
independently of its utilitarian aspects.45 Furthermore, Congress has established that
copyrightable, the rack was not copyrightable because the form of the rack was influenced by
utilitarian concerns and aesthetic elements that were not conceptually separable from the
utilitaian elements); Norris Indus. v. Intemational Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11 th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the wire-spoked automobile wheel cover was a useful article within
meaning of copyright law, not eligible for copyright protection), cert denied, 464 U.S. 818
(1983); Superior Form Builders v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 222,
223 (ED. Va. 1994) (holding forms used to mount animal skins not useful articles within
meaning of copyright law but copyrightable as sculptural works); Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact Intl,
Inc., 799 F. Supp. 980, 999-1000 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that novelty stationery items do not
have utilitarian function, so not useful articles that are denied copyright protection); Little Souls,
Inc. v. Petits, 789 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding doll's armhole designed to
accommodate automatic stuffing machine and to prevent arm from swinging excessively, and
face structure designed to make doll look more realistic are utilitarian functions and not
protected expressions within the meaning of U.S. copyright law); Act Young Imports, Inc. v.
B and E Sales Co., 667 F. Supp. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding artistic aspect of children's
backpacks separate from useful function, backpacks were copyrightable); Williams Electronics,
Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding only aspects of
game separable from its utilitarian aspects are copyrightable; Congress intended to exclude from
copyright protection functional elements of work included in rolling ball arcade game); Stein v.
Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (holding that thing intended solely for
practical use not copyrightable).
Before 1954, the courts applied the utilitarian article rule to allow copyright protection
for the forms embodied in works of artistic craftsmanship, but not the works' mechanical or
utilitarian aspects. Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1983). In
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), a lamp manufacturer copied a statuette that his competitor
used as a lamp base. Id. at 950. The United States Supreme Court held that although a lamp
is a useful article, because the statuette was removable from the lamp, it was subject to copyright
protection. Id. at 952. Following this "new" interpretation of what constitutes a useful article,
Congress defined the term "useful article" as an object which its utility comprises its sole
intrinsic function. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1990). Furthermore, Congress specifically excluded
from the definition appended artistic features that one could separately identify and that can exist
as an independent work of art. Id.
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (defining "useful" or "utilitarian" articles).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" as excluding
mechanical or utilitarian aspects of that work).
45. See, e.g., Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 670 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that sculptural work was not "useful article" and copyrightable because sole
utilitarian function is to portray appearance of article); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover
Corp., 773 F.2d 411,418 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that work of applied art with artistic features
that court could not identify separately from useful article was not copyrightable, regardless that
it may be aesthetically satisfying); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L. Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 974 (6th
Cir. 1983) (holding that copyright law allows only certain aspects of an item to be copyrightable
individually as separate and independent features). Individual aspects may be copyrighted only
when items are first, as whole, disallowed copyright protection as "useful articles." Id. See also
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that just as
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an article that is normally a component of a useful article is itself a useful article and
ineligible for copyright 46 The United States copyright law thereby denies protection
to useful articles that have any intrinsic utilitarian function, 7 not only those articles
having utility as their sole intrinsic function.s It follows, then, that an author can
copyright artistic, sculptural or decorative elements incorporated in a useful article
only if they are physically or conceptually separable from the article.49 This
requirement has resulted in fundamental disagreements regarding the classification of
certain works, making it difficult for the courts to separate an article's form from its
function.' Consequently, the process of determining what constitutes a useful article
has consumed considerable judicial resources, resulting in no fewer than four different
separability tests.'
Before Congress enact&l the AWCPA, courts consistently applied one or more of
copyright protection extends to expression but not ideas, copyright protection extends only to
artistic aspects, but not mechanical or utilitarian features of protected work); Acorn Structures,
Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F. Supp. 70, 75 (W.D. Va. 1987) (stating that Congress did not intend to
extend copyright protection to use of ideas found in copyrighted works; unauthorized use of
architectural plans was not infringement of architect's copyright), rev'd on other grounds, 846
F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101. "An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a
'useful article'." Id.
47. Id. (defining "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works"). The design of a useful article
may be protected only if, and only to the extent that, its artistic features can exist independently
of the utilitarian features of the article. Id.
48. Copyright Office and Procedures, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c). "If the sole intrinsic function
of an article is its utility, the fact that it is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a
work of art." Id.
49. See, e.g., National Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348,
1352 (SD. Cal. 1988) (holding masquerade costumes copyrightable to extent they had features
separately identifiable and capable of existing independently as work of art; features need only
be conceptually separable from utilitarian functions of garment to have copyright protection).
50. See, e.g., Brandir Intl, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding aesthetic elements of bicycle rack not conceptually separable from utilitarian
elements); Innovative Concepts in Entertainment, Inc. v. Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., 576
F. Supp. 457, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (expressing doubt that toy hockey players were utilitarian
articles, but even if they were, there are many ways of sculpting hockey player).
5 I. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
CoPYRIGHTs ON WORKS OF ARCHITECTURE xvii-xx (1989) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE
REPORT]. First, the Copyright Oflice interprets conceptual separability as meaning that
utilitarian items' artistic features, while physically inseparable, are clearly recognizable as
potentially a freestanding sculpture and independent of the shape of the useful article.
Paragraph 505.03, COMPENDIUM II COPYRIGHT OFFIcE PRACTICES, 1984, reprinted in
COPYRIGHTOFFICEREPORT, supra, at xviii. Second, the "temporal displacement" test requires
that the article "stimulate in the mind of the beholder" an artistic concept separate from the
utilitarian article. Id. at xix. A third approach is whether an ordinary observer would understand
the work as having both the function of a work of art and its utilitarian function. Id. at xx.
Finally, some courts have applied a two-prong test. Those applying this test first ask whether
an ordinary observer would conceive the presence of artistic features in a utilitarian object. If
so, they then ask whether the object's functions dictate those features. Id.
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the separability tests to preclude copyright protection for most architectural
structures.52 Functional, non-monumental works of architecture easily fit within the
courts' classification of utilitarian articles.53 Therefore, given the difficulty of
separating a building's utilitarian aspects from its design, the copyright law generally
denied architects any protection for constructed architectural works.54
Architects could, however, obtain copyright protection for nonfunctional or
monumental structures" categorized as "sculptural works."56 Furthermore, copyright
protection for original plans and technical drawings has long been available in the
52. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 941 (W.D. Tex.
1982) (holding building itself has intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
appearance of article or to convey information, and as such is useful article); Herman Frankel
Org. v. Wolfe, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819, 821 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (holding that aperson cannot,
by copyrighting plans, prevent the building of house similar to that taught by copyrighted plans,
but can prevent another from copying plans and using them to build house). See also DeSilva
Constr. Corp. v. Herald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 195 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (recognizing the view that
architects do not have an exclusive right to build structures embodied in technical writings,
permitting copying of constructed building and subsequent use of plans which closely resemble
originals). Copyright law limited protection to unauthorized copying or use by another of the
original plans themselves. Id. Copyright does not protect architectural plans from their use in
building a structure with the possible exception of a structure qualifying as a work of art. Id.
See also Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding
that a copyright of a drawing for bridge approach did not give copyright owner exclusive
property in art described; could not recover for infringement even if copyrighted drawing used
to design and construct bridge approach).
53. See COPYRIGHTOFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at xvii (quoting language of H.R. REP.
No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976), as stating that purely nonfunctional or monumental
structures would be subject to full copyright protection under 1976 law).
54. Id. Works which can satisfy the stringent conceptual separability standard are so rare
that, for all practical purposes, American copyright law provides no protection for architectural
structures. See, e.g., Gemeraft Homes, Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289,295 n.12 (E.D. Tex.
1988) (holding building not within subject matter of copyright); Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App.
2d 744,758 (1959) (holding that anyone with sufficient draftsmanship abilities may duplicate
structure's exterior); see also COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY No. 27: COPYRIGHT IN
ARCHITECTURAL WoRs 71 (Comm. Print 1960) (stating no protection in broad area of
functional structures which, though attractively designed, are not works of art).
55. Robert E. Saarino, Complexity, Contradiction and Copyright: Evolving Intellectual
Property Doctrine and the Practice of Architecture in the United States 45 (1994) (unpublished
M. Science thesis, University of Pennsylvania). For example, courts may consider the
Washington Monument in Washington, D.C., or the Statute of Liberty in New York City to be
nonfunctional structures. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 55 (1976); see, e.g., Hart v.
Sampley, No. 91-3068, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1154, at *5-*7 (D.D.C. June 24, 1992)
(dismissing argument that Vietnam Veterans Memorial cannot be separated from its functional
purpose of honoring Vietnam Veterans).
56. H.R.REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 55 (1976); see Jones Bros. C. v. Underkoffier, 16 F.
Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (holding design of memorial was "design for work of art"
within provision ofcopyright act notwithstanding memorial was "article of manufacture" as well
as "object of art").
10
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United States.57 Moreover, in 1988, Congress amended the current copyright law to
explicitly include protection for "architectural plans."" Nevertheless, after the 1988
amendment, the extent of the architects' copyright was still unclear. Questions
remained about which works the copyright protected,59 to what extent copyright
protected those works,' and how much control over the completed work remained
with the architect.6'
A copyright protects original work from unauthorized reproduction.62 With respect
to architectural works, there are at least six types of reproduction.63 One could copy
57. See, e.g., Eales v. Environmental Lifestyles, Inc., 958 F.2d 876, 879 (1992) (holding
architectural drawings and plans eligible for protection under copyright code as pictorial or
graphic works); Richmond Homes Management, Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1523
(W.D. Va. 1994) (holding that architectural structures and plans subject to copyright protection
where author has independently created work and work reflects creativity, regardless of how
simple design); CSM Investors, Inc. v. Everest Dev., Ltd., 840 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (D. Minn.
1994) (holding copyright law protects architectural plans and drawings as pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works and architectural works); Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, Inc.,
829 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding architectural plans are subject to federal
copyright protection).
Common law, supplemented by the Copyright act of 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 5(1), ch.
301,35 Stat. 1075, originally furnished protection for plans and technical drawings. See, e.g.,
Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., 476 F.2d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that
although the company sent architectural plans to contractors without any restrictions, permitted
interested persons to inspect building at all stages of construction and after completion, and
distributed catalogs containing photographs of building, this activity did not eliminate
company's common law copyright in plans); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895,
898 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating protected privilege of enjoying fruits of public dissemination is the
principal reason for seeking statutory protection rather than relying on common law
proprietorship). In 1976, Congress added technical drawings, diagrams, and models to the
scope of protection of the Copyright Act. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976).
58. Berne Convention Implementation Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §
4(aX1XA), 102 Stat. 2854 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works include diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including
architectural plans. Id. (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101).
59. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text (discussing works protected by various
copyright laws).
60. See infra notes 62, 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing extent of copyright
protection offered architectural works).
61. See infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text (discussing statutory limitations of
architects copyright and alienability of copyright).
62. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of copyright
protection).
63. Natalie Wargo, CopyrightProtection forArchitecture and the Berne Convention, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 403,439-42 (1990). In October, 1986, a joint World Intellectual Property
Organization/United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(WIPO/UNESCO) committee met to evaluate copyright protection for works of architecture.
Id. This committee recognized four types of reproduction: (1) copying plans in the form of
plans, (2) copying buildings in the form of buildings; (3) copying plans in the form of buildings;
11
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architectural plans as plans, as derivative works, or as a building.64 One might also
copy a building in the form of plans, 5 derivative works,' or another building. 7 The
1976 Act adequately protected architectural plans' and models from direct
duplication.69 However, because a constructed building is a useful articld, courts
found that United States copyright law did not prohibit the public from copying a
building in the form of plans,7' derivative works,7 2 or other buildings.73 By preventing
and (4) copying buildings in the form of plans. Id. The Committee agreed that building from
a plan is not mere execution, but copying. Id.
64. See id. at 439-42 (discussing possible forms of copying architectural works).
65. Id. Copying buildings in the form of plans is also known as "reverse engineering." Id.
66. See, e.g., Hart v. Sampley, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1154, at *4-*6 (holding that
defendants infringed the artist's copyright by selling derivative works copied from original work).
67. See, e.g, Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897,
914 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the builder who constructed a home substantially similar to
one already constructed was not liable for copyright infringement).
68. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 55 (1976). Architectural plans includes plans,
sketches, drawings and renderings. Id. The 1976 House Report states that "[a]n architecfs
plans and drawings would, of course, be protected by copyright .... " Id.
69. See Laura E. Steinfeld, The Berne Convention and Protection of Works ofArchitecture:
Why the United States Should Create a New Subject Matter Category for Works of
Architecture Under Section 102(A) of the Copyright Act of 1976,24 IND. L. REv. 459,462
(1991) (discussing circumstances when copying of protected architectural plans was permissible
under 1988 copyright law); Erika White, Note, Standing on Shaky Ground: Copyright
Protection for Works of Architecture, 6 ART & L. 70, 72 (1981) (discussing copying
architectural plans and models). As of December 11, 1996, there were no published cases in
which a claimant argues that an architect's copyright in a model has been infringed.
70. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (applying useful article doctrine to
constructed architectural works).
71. See Smith v. Paul, 345 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that anyone with
sufficient draftsmanship abilities may duplicate structure's exterior). Because copyright law did
not protect the architectural design in a building, unauthorized copying of the design in any
media, including plans - as long as copyrighted plans were not used - would not constitute
infringement. CoPYPIGHT LAW REvISION STUDY No. 27: CoPYRiGHT IN ARCHITECTURAL
WoRKs 71 (Comm. Print 1960).
72. As of December 11, 1996, there were no published cases explicitly holding this.
However, copyright law is applicable only to articles within its scope of protection. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). Architectural works, falling outside that scope, are therefore not protected from
unauthorized copying in the form of derivative works. See, e.g., Michael F. Clayton & Ron N.
Dreben, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works: Congress Changes the Rules, 4 No.
3 1 PROPRiETARYRTS. 15, 15 (stating that federal copyright law has not traditionally protected
copyright owners against direct copying of buildings themselves). But see Hart v. Sampley,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1154, at *5 (rejecting "useful article" argument as defense against
copyright infringement when defendants sold t-shirts and photographs depicting sculpture).
73. See Robert R. Jones Assoc., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274,280 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that one may build house identical to house depicted in copyrighted architectural plans,
but may not directly copy those plans to construct house). Courts have had difficulty in
determining copyright protection for the architectural plans embodied in buildings. See Scholz
Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 87 (6th Cir. 1967) (holding that making plans and
12
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architects from copyrighting their constructed works, the United States copyright law
provided far less protection than the copyright laws of most every other developed
nation.7 '4
C. The United States and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works
The United States approach of granting only property rights to the author is contrary
to the prevailing European view that copyright is a natural or moral right75 and is
constructing house was not infringement of corporation's copyrighted booklet containing
architectural plan and design of same house); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 664
(SD.N.Y. 1988) (holding that building imitating that depicted in copyrighted architectural plans
does not constitute inflingement of those plans); Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp.
1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (holding copyright does not prevent building of house similar
to that taught by copyrighted plans, but may prevent another from copying plans and using them
to build house).
While an architecfs drawings are the expression of her ideas, many courts considered
the structure depicted therein was the idea itself. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text
(discussing idea/expression distinction). Therefore, any copy of a building was permissible if
the builder did not duplicate the protected blueprints themselves. Imperial Homes Corp. v.
Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972). No infringement occurs because a structure is
merely a result of the plans, not a "copy" of them. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51,
at 37. It was therefore permissible to have a draftsperson copy or adapt architectural plans.
DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 195 (M.D. Fla. 1962). In addition, a
builder could use the plans directly, without copying them, to construct a structure substantially
similar to the one depicted in the protected drawings. See id. at 195 (stating that architect does
not have exclusive right to build structures embodied in technical writings); see also Imperial
Homes, 458 F.2d at 899 (stating that copyrighted drawings do not "clothe their author" with
exclusive right to reproduce dwelling); Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp.
928, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that architect does not have exclusive right to execute
drawings). Although copyright law granted architects protection for their drawings, the actual
protection provided was extremely limited. David Shipley, Copyright Protection for
Architectural Works, 37 S.C. L. REv. 393,410 (1986). Absent a right to prevent infringing
construction, the effectiveness of copyright protection of architectural works was sharply
diminished. Id. The value of architectural plans depends on control over the right to build;
protection for plans but not buildings renders copyright protection almost meaningless. Id.
74. See COPYRIGHTOFFICEREPORT, supra note 51, at 223 (stating that virtually every Berne
member country makes express reference to copyright protection for buildings and structures).
75. Belanger, supra note 22, at 383. Moral rights, or le droit moral, are authors' personal
rights. Id. Moral rights typically include the right to be known as the author of one's work and
the right to prevent others from being named as author of that work. 1 NMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 28, § 8D.01A. Generally, moral rights also grant the author the right to prevent
others from claiming authorship of her work, the right to withdraw a published work, and the
right to prevent others from deforming or defacing her work. Id. Finally, moral rights may
include the author's right to prevent others from using her name or work in a way that would
violate the author's good name or professional standing. Id.
13
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personal to the artist. 6 Although each country's laws vary, European copyright laws
typically provide the basic protection afforded by United States' law." In addition,
European copyright generally includes the artist's right to claim authorship7s and to
control alterations, 79 public display, and resale of the protected wdtk. Some
countries also recognize the artist's right to withdraw a work from the public and to
receive protection from excessive criticism.' Thus, American copyright law falls
short of the protection most European nations grant."
Furthermore, many European authors and artists have enjoyed international
copyright protection for the past 100 years.8 4 Under the Beme Convention for the
76. Na&MER ON CoPyRIGHT, supra note 28, at § 8D.01A. As a moral right is personal to
the artist, it is inalienable and non-waivable. See, e.g., Christine L. Chinni, Droit d'auteur
Versus theEconomics of Copyright Implicationsfor American Law ofAccession to the Berne
Convention, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 145 (1992) (comparing Anglo-American copyright law
to French copyright law, which is based upon moral rights).
77. Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists'Rights and Historic Preservation, 12
CARDoZOARTS &ENT. L. J431,439 (1994). Countries recognizing moral rights believe those
rights are inherent in the creative process and are only minimally subject to government
intervention. Id. Therefore, hose countries grant broad copyright protection. Id.
78. Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 63, 91 (1993). The right of attribution (or paternity right) includes the right to
claim authorship and the right to prevent the false designation of authorship. Id. The author
also has the right to prevent the use of her name on a work which another has distorted,
mutilated, or modified in a manner prejudicial to her honor or reputation. Id. Attempts to claim
the right of attribution under United States copyright law have been rejected. See, e.g.,
Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim to right of
attribution as contributing author in published work); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc, 164 F.2d 522, 526
(7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) (rejecting claim for right of attribution for
drawings published in Esquire Magazine).
79. Wargo, supra note 63, at 433. The right of integrity in a work is the right of the author
to prevent distortions and to control alterations or modifications of her work. Id. U.S. copyright
law does not grant this right. Phelan, supra note 78, at 91. But cf Shostakovich v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S. 2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (stating that under doctrine of moral
rights, court can prevent use of musical composition or literary work in such manner as will be
violative of the composer's or author's rights), affd, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (App. Div. 1949).
80. See Gerstenblith, supra note 77, at 439 (discussing moral rights included in European
copyright laws).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 439-40.
83. Compare supra notes 9-74 and accompanying text (discussing copyright protection
granted by U.S. laws) with supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing copyright
protection granted by European laws).
84. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Revision, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention Text]. The Berne
Convention is an international treaty representing nations from all over the world. Id.
Beginning with a membership of only ten countries, by January 1, 1988 77 nations were party
to the Berne Convention. JOSEPH GREENWALD AND CHARLEs LEVY, INTRODUCTION,
PROTECTION OFINTELLECTuAL PROPERTY RIGHTS; BERNE CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 9,1886
FORTHEPROTECTONOFLTrrERARYANDARTIsTIC WORKS, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 711 (1989) [hereinafter
14
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Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 5 authors and artists were eligible for
copyright protection in countries throughout the world that recognized the Berne
Convention." This protection was automatic, with its sole condition being first
publication of the work in any country acceding to the Convention.' The United
States, however, originally declined to join this international alliance.' In rejecting
the Berne Convention, Congress asserted that fundamental differences in copyright
protection regarding duration,' formalities," and moral rights9 prevented the United
GREENwALD & LEVY].
85. Berne Convention Text, supra note 84. The drafters concluded the Treaty on
September 9, 1886, and the signatories completed it in Paris on May 4, 1896. WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGAMZATION, GuIDE TO TBE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTIsTIc WORKs (PARIS ACT, 1971) 5 (1978) [hereinafter
WIPO GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION]. The parties revised the Treaty in Berlin on
November 13, 1908, completed it in Berne on March 20, 1914, again revised it in Rome on
June 2,1928, Brussels on June 26,1948, Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and in Paris on July 24,
1971, and amended it on October 2, 1979. Id. at 6.
86. See GORMAN & GINsBURG, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing the Berne Convention).
87. Id.
88. GREENWALD &LEVY, supra note 84, at introduction. The United States declined to join
the Berne Convention, electing to develop its own system of international copyright relations.
Hixon, supra note 13, at 631. Prior to joining the Berne Convention, the United States
remained a "copyright island," with copyright law inconsistent with the laws of most Berne
Convention nations. Id. at 632 n.15.
89. Beme Convention Text, supra note 84. Article 7(1) of the Berne Convention provides
that copyright protection endures for a term equal to the author's life plus 50 years. Id. at art.
7(1). Prior to 1988, the United States followed the dual system of limited statutory copyright
protection for certain published and unpublished works. Wargo, supra note 63, at 404 n.6. See
also CopyrightAct of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 2,24,35 Stat. 1075, 1080, repealed by Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-553, §§ 302-303,90 Stat. 2541,2572-73 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 302-303).
90. Beme Convention Text, supra note 84. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention prohibits
subjecting copyright protection on compliance with any formalities such as registration or notice.
Id. at art. 5(2). Under the United States' 1909 Act, failure to comply with requirements of
notice, registration, renewal, and mandatory deposit of copies could result in loss of copyright
protection. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 10, 14, 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1080-81,
repealed by Copyright Act of.1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, §§ 401- 412, 90 Stat. 2541,2576-83
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412).
91. Berne Convention Text, supra note 84. Article 6' of the Berne Convention provides
that an author has the right to claim authorship in her work (right of paternity) and the right to
object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work prejudicial to her honor
or reputation (right of integrity). Id. at art. 6'(1). United States copyright law does not provide
specifically for moral rights. Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States andArticle
6bis ofthe Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on U.S. Adherence to theBerne Convention, 10 COLuM.-VLA J.L. &ARTs 655,661-63
(1986). Although U.S. copyright law does not provide any meaningful protection for moral
rights, this protection may be available, to some degree, through contract, unfair competition,
or tort theories, or through state statutes. Id.
15
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States from joining the Convention.'
However, by the latter-half of this century the international dimension of copyright
law assumed increasing importance in the United States.93 American popular culture
and information products had become export commodities of immense economic
value.' Efforts to provide adequate and effective copyright protection for these works
prompted Congress to bring United States copyright law into compliance with
international standards." In 1988, the United States finally subscribed' to the Berne
Convention, the world's oldest7 and most important copyright convention." By doing
so, it signaled its alignment with most other nations' conceptions of copyright
protection."
Nevertheless, the treaty's implementation'" required that the United States resolve
its fundamental copyright differences with the Beme Convention. As early as 1976,
92. See 133 CoNG. REc. H1293 (daily ed. March 16, 1987) (statement ofRep. Kastenmeier)
(presenting Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987 and stating reasons why U.S. had
not previously joined Convention).
93. See GoRMAN&GiNsBURGsupra note 9, at 874 (discussing importance of international
copyright protection).
94. 134 CoNG. REc. S14549 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1988) (statement of Senator DeConcini).
The United States was, at this time, the world's largest exporter of copyrighted works, including
books, sound recordings, motion pictures, and computer software. 133 CONG. Rc. S7369
(daily ed. May 29, 1987) (statement of Senator Leahy). In 1988, worldwide piracy of these
works had resulted in an estimated loss of over $7.2 billion in the computer and entertainment
industries. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 9, at 874.
95. See 134 CONG. REc. S14549 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1988) (statement of Senator
DeConcini) (debating amendments to Beme Convention Implementation Act); 133 CoNG. REc,
87369 (daily ed. May 29, 1987) (statement of Senator Leahy) (introducing Berne Convention
Implementation Act). By the mid 1980's, continued U.S. non-participation in the Berne
Convention presented a variety of problems. Dawn M. Larson, The Effect of the Berne
Implementation Act of1988 on CopyrightProtectionfor Architectural Structures, 1990 U. ILL.
L.REv. 151, 157-58 (1990). The primary benefit ofjoining the Berne Convention was more
stringent enforcement and remedies for violations of American overseas copyright. Id.
96. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 9, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter BCIA of 1988]. On
October 31, 1988, President Reagan signed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.
Id.
97. WIPO GuIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 85, at preface.
98. See H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,
6942 (describing Berne Convention as world's "most important" copyright agreement).
99. See Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The
U.S. JoinstheBerne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &ARTS 1, 1 (1988) (discussing United
States acquiescence to Berne Convention's terms).
100. 133 CoNG. REc. H1293 (daily ed. March 16, 1987) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
Before ratifying the Berne Convention, Congress stated that the Berne Treaty was not
self-executing, BCIA of 1988, supra note 96, at § 2(1)-(2), and insisted that only congressional
action could implement the Berne Convention Treaty's terms. 133 CONG. REC. H1293 (daily
ed. March 16,1987) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The resulting legislation was the BCIA
of 1988, supra note 96, which, according to Congress, brought United States copyright law into
minimal conformity with the standards of the Berne Convention. Id.
16
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Congress began this process by enacting provisions for the duration of copyright
protection... consistent with the Berne Convention's requirements." ° Although the
1976 Act did not eliminate the statutory formalities of copyright protection, 0 3 it altered
them in an attempt to comply with the spirit of the Convention's terms.'0 4 The 1976
legislation brought the United States' copyright law closer to conforming with the
Berne Convention's standards, but several barriers to complete compliance
remained.'
With the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,6 Congress adopted a
minimalist approach in accepting the Berne Convention's terms. 7 In so doing, it
removed most of the remaining barriers to full compliance!' 5 Congress, however,
failed to give adequate attention"° to at least one area in which United States copyright
101. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302-303 (stating copyright in work created after January 1,
1978, subsists from its creation and endures for term consisting of life of author and fifty years
after author's death), and Berne Convention Text, supra note 84, at art. 7(1) (stating copyright
protection granted by Berne Convention shall be life of author and fifty years after author's
death).
102. 133 CONo. REc. H1293 (daily ed. March 16, 1987) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
In many ways Congress drafted and passed the 1976 copyright Act with a "weather eye" on
Beme Convention adherence. Id.
103. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (1976) (setting notice and registration requirements for
copyright protection).
104. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 28, § 17.01 [B][1], at 17-9. Failure to comply
with the formalities set out in 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (1976) does not result in the complete loss
of copyright protection, and therefore complies with Article 5(2) of the Beme Convention. Id.
However, in both the 1976 Act and the BCIA of 1988, supra note 96, Congress failed to
address the Berne Convention's treatment of moral rights. Phelan, supra note 78, at 92. The
Beme Convention Implementation Act did not expand any rights of artists to claim authorship
of their work. Id. Nor did it affect an author's right to object to any distortion, modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to the work. Id.
105. See The Berne Convention: Hearings on S.1301 and S.1971 before the Subcomm.
on Patent% Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.,
143 (1988) [hereinafter Berne Convention Hearings] (Statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights) (testifying U.S. copyright law failed to meet terms of Berne Convention in areas of
formalities and notice, compulsory license for jukeboxes, architectural works, and moral rights).
106. BCIA of 1988, supra note 96.
107. See 133 CoNG. REC. S7369 (daily ed. May 29, 1987) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(declaring that in order to examine future Berne issues with specificity, proposed bill designed
to only minimally comply with terms of treaty).
108. Id.
109. Berne Convention Hearings, supra note 105, at 54 (testimony of Rep. Kastenmeier).
For example, in 1988 Representative Kastenmeier reported there was very little testimony on
the desirability of copyright protection for architecture during the House hearings on the Berne
Convention. Id. He further testified that Congress was not sufficiently prepared to address
copyright protection of architectural works. Id. at 69. Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights also
cited insufficient public debate on protection of architecture as a reason to exclude architectural
works from those covered bythe Berne Convention Implementation Act. Id. at 138 (statement
of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
Later that year, Representative Kastenmeier reported that because the public did not pressure
17
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protection failed to meet the Berne Convention requirements: architectural works."1
Because the Berne Convention requires that member nations extend full copyright
protection to architectural works,' Congress requested that the Copyright Office
determine whether the existing copyright law"' adequately protected architectural
works to minimally meet the Berne Convention's requirements."' The Copyright
Office report concluded that current law did not fulfill the Berne Convention
requirements"' and recommended four possible legislative alternativA. One
recommendation was to implement legislation similar to the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act."'
Congress to provide copyright protection for architectural works, Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings on HR 1623 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 76,
90 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier), they became a neglected area of study during the
Berne Hearings. Id. at 654. Although neglected, the issue of whether the Berne Convention
required protection for architectural works "lurked in the background" of the hearings. Id. at
679. However, the limited testimony on the matter left uncertainty whether to offer copyright
protection to architectural works, and the issue was left to be resolved at a later date. H.R. REP.
No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1988).
110. See infra notes 184-194 and accompanying text (showing that Berne Convention
requirements do not allow exception for pictorial representations).
111. Berne Convention Text, supra note 84, at art. 2(1). Works of architecture include
illustrations, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to architecture. Id.
112. See S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988) (stating that Copyright Office is
to review protection afforded architecture in United States and other Berne countries and
recommend whether increased protection is necessary); Notice of Inquiry: Works of
Architecture, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,536,21,538 (1988), reprinted in COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT,
supra note 51, at Appendix B, (stating Copyright Office studying, at request of congressional
subcommittees, whether increased legal protection for architectural works needed).
113. Notice of Inquiry: Works of Architecture, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,536, 21,538 (1988),
reprinted in COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at Appendix B; see also 134 CONG.
REc. S14,549, S14,552 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that
Congress modified U.S. law only to extent necessary for acceptance into Berne Convention).
114. CoPYRiGHT OFFIcE REPORT, supra note 51, at xxii.
115. Id. at 221-26 (1989). The Copyright Office Report proposed four alternative solutions.
Id. at 221. The first was to create a new subject matter category in the Copyright Act to cover
architectural works. Id. at 223. The second proposal was to amend the Copyright Act to
expand the protection provided plans to cover unauthorized construction therefrom. Id. at 224.
The third alternative was to redefine "useful article" to exclude unique architectural buildings.
Id at 225. Fourth, the Copyright Report suggested that Congress do nothing, and allow the
courts to develop appropriate remedies. Id.
116. Id. The AWCPA created a new subject matter category in the Copyright Act to cover
architectural works. 136 CoNG. REc. E259 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR ARc rrECTURAL WoRKs
A. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990
In 1990, Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act"7 with the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act 18 ("AWCPA"). Prompted by the Copyright Office
report, Congress enacted the AWCPA to more closely align United States copyright
protection with that required by the Berne Convention." 9 In adopting the AWCPA,
Congress determined that, as a form of artistic expression, architecture performs
significant domestic and international societal purposes. 0 The primary function of
the AWCPA is to provide protection for architectural works embodied in constructed
buildings.' The AWCPA also ensures copyright protection for architectural plans,
drawings and models'22 under its provisions for pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works.In American architect' 24 now enjoy some amount of copyright protection in
a building's design as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including
buildings, plans, models or drawings."
When an architectural design is embodied in a building, however, the architect's
copyright is very limited.' 26 Of the five exclusive privileges enumerated in the 1976
117. See HIRRREP.NO. 735, 101st Cong. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6941
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT 101-735] § I (reciting that Copyright Act of 1990 is amendment
of prior law).
118. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701,703, 104 Stat. 5128, 5133 (1990) (codified at scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AWCPA].
119. See HousE REPORT 101-735, supra note 117, § 1 (citing reasons for enacting
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act).
120. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 6936.
121. Id. at 6942.
122. HousE REPORT 101-735, supra note 117, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,
6950. An architect possesses two separate copyrights for a completed architectural work: a
copyright in the constructed building as defined in 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(aX8), and a copyright in
the plans, drawings and models, protected by 17 U.S.CA. § 102(aX5). Id. Congress' intent
was to keep the two forms of protection separate; a person may infringe either or both
copyrights, and each may separately provide for damages. Id.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5).
124. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 7. In this article, "architect" is used
interchangeably with "copyright owner," as the architect or designer is generally the creator of
the work and initially holds the copyright. Id.
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "architectural work").
126. HousE REPORT 101-735, supra note 117, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,
6950. An architectural design embodied in a building receives only the limited protection
offered an architectural work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX8). Id. A design embodied in any
tangible medium of expression other than a building (such as architectural plans and models)
has "dual" protection. Id. U.S. laws grant the architect one copyright in the architectural work,
and the other in the plans or drawings under 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5). Id. A copy may infringe
either or both of these copyrights. Id.
19
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Act,"' architects may fully enjoy only two when seeking to protect a constructed
building's design. Architects hold only the exclusive right to exactly duplicate an
architectural structure' and the exclusive right to distribute those duplicates to the
public.'" The right to publicly perforni3  or display' the work does not apply to
architectural design, and the AWCPA virtually eliminates the architect's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works.'
B. Limitations on the Architects'Right to Create and Distribute Derivative Works
A derivative work is the recasting, transformation or adaptation of a protected
work.' Copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right to recast, transform or adapt a
protected work,"3 unless that work is an architectural design embodied in a
building.' When a built structure is the architect's chosen medium of expression, she
no longer has the exclusive right to transform or adapt her work,'36 nor does she
possess the exclusive right to recast her design in other mediums of expression.37
Under the AWCPA's provisions, the architect must forego the exclusive right to
adapt her design, as embodied in a building, in favor of the building's owner. 3
Congress recognized that, to fully utilize a built structure, a building owner must be
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting exclusive rights to do or authorize: (1) reproduction of
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) derivative works based upon copyrighted work;
(3) distribution of copies or phonorecords of copyrighted work to public; (4) public performance
of copyrighted work; and (5) public display of copyrighted work).
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (granting exclusive right to reproduce or authorize
reproduction of copyrighted work).
129. See id. § 106(3) (granting exclusive right to distribute or authorize distribution of
copies to public).
130. See id. § 106(4) (applying section only to literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, motion pictures, other audiovisual works).
131. See id. § 106(5) (applying section only to literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including architectural sketches
and renderings).
132. See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on architects
exclusive right to derivative works).
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "derivative work").
134. See id. § 106(2) (granting copyright owner exclusive right to authorize or prepare
derivative works).
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing differences between copyright
protection afforded plans and buildings).
136. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (limiting architect's exclusive right to make alterations to
copyrighted work).
137. See id. § 120(a) (eliminating architects exclusive right to make pictorial representations
of copyrighted work).
138. Id. § 120(b). The owner of a building embodying an architectural work may destroy
or make alterations to the building. The owner is free to do so without the consent of the author
or copyright owner of the architectural work. Id.
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able to freely adapt and change the building."I Consequently, Congress gave building
owners the right to modify and to alter the building's design, and even to destroy the
building, without the copyright owner's permission.'4
The AWCPA also denies the copyright owner the exclusive right to recast protected
works in other mediums of expression. 4' Allowing the public to create and to exploit
pictorial representations'42 of protected works, the AWCPA eliminates the architects'
exclusive rights to prepare derivative works.' On the surface, this limiting provision
seems unambiguous and necessary."' Without the "pictorial representation
exception," a tourist could not photograph a spectacular building and a movie director
139. See Winick, supra note 8, at 1623 (discussing purpose of excluding exclusive right of
transformation).
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (establishing building owner's right to destroy or make
alterations to building). Architects readily conceded this point. Winick, supra note 8, at 1624.
They recognized that if the copyright owner held the exclusive right to alter or destroy the
building, building owners would demand that the architect give up their copyright.
ArchitecturalDesign Protection: Hearings on H.R. 3990 and 3991 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990) (statement of Michael Graves). Thus, architects
agreed with Congresd decision to restrict their rights in their design's copyright. Winick, supra
note 8, at 1624. Under the AWCPA, an architect who wants to retain the right to approve
alterations to her work may still reserve that right as a matter of contract law. Id. State law
claims of conversion, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment also remain available to
architects. Id. at 1623 n.128.
Additionally, local historic preservation and landmark laws can protect a work that the
community deems to be of historic or aesthetic value. Id. at 1624. These laws typically define
the conditions under which a building owner may alter or destroy the protected building. For
example, California law provides that the Department of Natural Resources will register those
buildings that it deems to be important historical resources or of sufficient historical interest as
historical landmarks. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5021 (West Supp. 1995). To carry out historic
preservation projects, the State Office of Historic Preservation may preserve and manage
historical resources under its control. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5079.22 (West Supp. 1995). The
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act explicitly defers to the protection provided by
such locallaws. 17 U.S.C. § 301(bX2). It does not preempt state and local landmark, historical
preservation, zoning, or building codes, relating to architectural works protected under 17
U.S.C. § 102(aX8). Id. Therefore, although Congress has declined to extend copyright
protection to encompass transformation of a constructed design, the architect has other available
protection for deserving works. Id.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a).- As applied to architectural works constructed in public view, the
architect's copyright does not include the right to prevent others from making, distributing, or
publicly displaying pictorial representations of the work. Id.
142. Id. The pictorial representation exception allows the general public to make, distribute,
and publicly display pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the
copyrighted work. Id.
143. See id. § 106(2) (granting copyright owner exclusive right to recast, transform, or adapt
protected works).
144. See Wiick, supra note 8, at 1625 n.133 (discussing pictorial representation provision
and stating that Congress included it as practical necessity).
21
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could not film scenes in a neighborhood of protected structures. 45 Moreover, an
individual looking for design inspiration could not even sketch a building to borrow
design elements'46 without potentially violating the architect's copyright. 4 ' To avoid
this, Congress created the exception justifying it by declaring that such an exception
would not interfere with the architects' "normal exploitation" of their works. 148
Because pictorial representations are not a normal exploitation of an architectural
work, Congress reasoned. the allowed reproductions do not affect the architect. 49
145. COPYRIGHT OFFIcE REPORT, supra note 51, at 172. French law allows architects to
control two-dimensional reproductions of their work. Id. When the film Last Tango in Paris
was set in recognizable architectural spaces, the film makers avoided a verdict of infringement
only because the spaces were not absolutely recognizable. Judgment of June 13, 1973, Trib.
gr. inst., 94 GP 27, 28 (Fr.).
146. House REPORT 101-735, supra note 117. The Report states that millions of tourists
take home photographs, posters, and other pictorial representations of prominent architectural
works as souvenirs from their trip. Id. Additionally, it says that scholarly books on architecture
rely on the ability to freely use photographs of architectural works. Id. The public purpose
served by such uses coupled with a "lack of harmoto the copyright owner" prompted Congress
to provide the pictorial
representation exception, rather than rely on the fair use doctrine. Id.
147. WIPO GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 85, at 54. The right to
reproduce protected works is the very essence of copyright. Id. The Berne Convention
encompasses all means of reproduction, either by processes known or those yet to be discovered.
Id. But see infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text (discussing fair use exception to
copyright protection).
148. HOUSEREPORT 101-735, supra note 117. This is true if the only normal exploitation
is the construction of a similarstructure and not the reproduction of the structure in other forms
such as pictures, posters, postcards, etc. See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text
(showing frequency that derivative works are copied from protected architectural works).
However, exploitation of architectural works has been a highly profitable enterprise for many.
For example, the San Francisco Museum of Modem Art, infra note 157, has sold $5.5 million
of merchandise - T-shirts, tote bags, caps, & umbrellas depicting a logo based on the museum's
design - in one year, including 10,000 postcards of the building. Jesse Hamlin, SFMOMA:
The Main Attraction, S.F. EXAM. & CHRON., Jan. 14, 1996, Datebook, at 29. A three-
dimensional replica of the museum enshrined in a version of the snow globe, called the "Fog
Dome," is also a "big seller." Id. See also infra notes 150-158 and accompanying text
(discussing architects' market interest in derivative works).
149. HOUSE REPORT 101-735, supra note 117. Since copyright protection is to benefit the
general public, Congress will only grant a monopoly to the artist to provide incentive for the
creative process. Id. Congress believed that the pictorial representation exception would not
significantly deter architectural creativity. Architectural Design Protection: Hearings on H.R
3990 and 3991 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1990)
[hereinafterAWCPA Hearings] (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
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m. ANALYsIs
A. A Closer Look at the Pictorial Representation Exception
Congress's normal exploitationjustification is inconsistent with the traditional view
of United States copyright protection. Historically, Congress has enacted copyright
laws to benefit the public by protecting the author's market interest. 50 A protected
market interest enables an author to recoup revenues generated from all different uses
of the artistic works.' This approach provides copyright protection in each market
segment that an author might commercially exploit the protected work, either in
original or derivative form.' Accordingly, a conventional application of United
States copyright law would protect both original and derivative forms of an architect's
work, whether it was normal exploitation of the work or not 53
Although the pictorial representation exception applies only to two-dimensional
copying, 5' the implications of this exception are untested as it relates to three-
dimensional derivative works.' For example, a souvenir vendor can legally sell
150. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1175 (1994) (holding that
the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding artist's legally protected interest
is not his reputation, but his interest in potential financial returns from his works that derives
from lay public's recognition of his efforts); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533,
536 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding that artist or author entitled to any lawful use of his property by
which he may get a profit out of it; copyright protects commercial value of property to
encourage arts); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 37 (C.C.N.Y. 1893) (rejecting argument that
because publication of lithograph did not impair value of original photograph, lithograph did not
infringe photographer's copyright). The effect the copy may have on the value of the original
does not affect the question of infringement; copyright entitles an artist to any lawful use of her
property. Id. See aLso Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (holding that
labors of original author appropriated by another, however minor, is sufficient to constitute
piracy pro tanto). Copyright protection, in its entirety, is the property of the author, and it is no
defense that another person has appropriated only a small portion of that property. Id.
151. See J.H. Reichman, Review Essay: Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist's
Approach to a TechnologicalAge, 43 STAN. L. Rnv. 943, 956 (1991) (discussing market
interest purposes for historical copyright legislation).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 956 n.92 (stating that market interest approach enables author to recoup revenues
generated from all uses of work in each market segment that author may commercially exploit).
Conventional application of copyright law incorporates the market interest approach to copyright
protection. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text (discussing market interest
approach to copyright protection).
154. See Gerstenblith, "supra note 77, at 448 (explaining that pictorial representation
exception does not apply to three-dimensional copies).
155. As of December 11, 1996, there were no published cases involving a 17 U.S.C. §
120(a) determination. Three-dimensional copies may include models, figurines, statuettes,
paperweights, snow domes, pencil sharpeners, clocks, furniture, etc., each duplicating the
architects design as originally manifested in a building. Carl M. Sapers, Second Thoughts on
the 1990 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, 13 A.P.R. CONsTRUCTION L. 16, 17
23
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unauthorized postcards'56 depicting the San Francisco Museum of Modem AR.!
Arguably, however, the vendor would violate the architect's copyright if she were to
sell three-dimensional paperweights depicting the same building.158 How, then, is the
law applied when the vendor sells a model kit comprised of two-dimensional pieces
that the purchaser is to assemble into a three-dimensional model? A computer-
generated model? A CD-ROM? A hologram? Under the AWCPA, the answer to
these questions remains unclear.
This two-dimensional/three-dimensional ambiguity dramatizes some difficulties
created by the pictorial representation exception. Other difficulties arise in works
described as both sculptural and architectural, such as the Washington Monument.'59
If the courts classify the structure as neither a building nor a sculptural work, the
structure has no copyright protection. " If they classify the structure as a building, the
(1993).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). A postcard would come under the pictorial representation
exception as making and distributing pictures, photographs, or other pictorial representations of
the work. Id.
157. Karen D. Stein, A Monument to Art, AXcHrr cTuRAL RECORD, Nov. 1994, at 74.
Designed by Mario Botta, the San Francisco Museum of Modem Art is a modem building,
constructed in 1994. Id. at 77-82. It is of a distinctive design, consisting of a stepped facade,
a central cylindrical skylight, and brick and granite cladding. Id. Mr. Botta's design, as
embodied in the building, has been copied as posters, postcards, model kits, magnets, models
and snow-domes, all for purchase by mail-order and in the museum's gift shop. SAN FRANcIsco
MUSEUM OF MODERNART, MArL ORDER CATALOG 2-8 (Fall 1995). See also supra note 148
and accompanying text (discussing architects' market interest in architectural works).
158. See Jane C. Ginsberg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual
ArtistsRightsAct and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of1990, 14 COLUM.-
VLAJ.L. &ARTs477,495 (1990) (stating that pictorial representation exception does not apply
to three-dimensional reproductions). Assuming, of course, that a paperweight is not a useful
article. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing useful articles); infra notes
165-171 and accompanying text (discussing application of separability test to AWCPA).
The market value of such souvenirs is not trivial. The tradition of collecting miniature
buildings can be traced to Victorian times, when travelers on the European grand tour would
purchase architectural models as souvenirs of their joumeys. Eric Adams, A Little Sprawl:
Souvenir building Collectors Chase After the World'sMonuments, AIARcHrrEcT, Oct., 1995,
at 7. Today, there are hundreds of collectors represented by the Souvenir Building Collectors
Society, and private collections can exceed 2,000 miniature architectural replicas. Id.
159. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 730-31 (M.D. Pa. 1936)
(holding monuments analogous to sculptural works and, therefore, subject to full copyright
protection); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976) (describing purely
nonfunctional or monumental structures as sculpture subject to full copyright protection);
Shipley, supra note 73, at 404 nA8 (stating that purely nonfunctional structures are analogous
to sculptural works and, thus, subject to copyright protection).
160. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong. 1990, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6935.
Congress deleted the phrase "or three-dimensional structure" from the definition of an
"architectural work." This phrase was originally intended to cover architectural works embodied
in innovative structures that defy easy classification. However, it was deleted because the phrase
also could be interpreted as covering interstate highway bridges, cloverleafs, canals, dams, and
pedestrian walkways. Congress determined that protection for these works is not necessary to
24
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copyright law would afford the structure some protection."" However, if the courts
classify the structure as a non-functional sculpture,' the structure receives full
copyright protection under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).'6 It remains to be
seen, however, whether sculptulral components of an architectural work are protected
as visual arts or as architectural works.'"
To determine, then, whether the copyright law protects a structure as a work of
visual art," 5 an architectural workl," botl or neithe?, one must return to the
conceptual separability test. This test requires that the building's function be readily
stimulate creativity or prohibit unauthorized reproduction. Id.
161. See supra notes 117-149 and accompanying text (discussing protection offered
architectural works under AWCPA).
162. See Phelan, supra note 78, at 92 (discussing Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 as it
applies to architectural works). The Visual Artists Rights Act provides moral rights for visual
artists. Id. The Act grants visual artists the right of attribution and the right of integrity. 17
U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. V 1993).
163. The Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter VARA], offers full copyright protection
to the visual arts, including sculpture. See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5128 (applying
pictorial representation exception to only two-dimensional copies).
164. As of December 11, 1996 there were no published cases addressing this issue. The
House Committee's Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act contemplated that at least
selected works of architecture - those containing elements physically or conceptually separable
from their utilitarian function - would be protected as sculptural works to the extent of their
separability. H.R REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 55 (1976). Furthermore, the definition of an
"architectural work" does not include individual features of a structure. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). A work of visual art is a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture
existing in a single copy or a limited edition of 200 copies that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the artist. Id. § 101.
166. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing conceptual separability as
applied to architectural works). This approach is analogous to the separability test required
under the 1976 Act, where the courts separated - either physically or conceptually - the
utilitarian aspects of a work to determine what, if anything, was copyrightable in the work. Id.
Rather than suggesting that the courts look at the utilitarian aspects of a structure, Congress
requires that the courts completely separate the structure's functional aspects from its aesthetic
aspects. H.R. RP. No. 735, 101st Cong. 20-21 (1990).
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (defining scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works). This section gives little guidance to the courts when asked to separate
functional works from the nonfunctional. Id. Instead of allowing an all-encompassing
protection to architectural works, the section creates confusion as to what is an architectural
work, what is a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, and what is denied copyright completely.
Id.
168. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (explaining that if useful article's
function is not conceptually separable from its aesthetic aspects, it is not copyrightable). The
AWCPA grants copyright protection only to architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX8). It
follows, then, that a "useful article" that is not an "architectural work" still has no copyright
protection.
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and separately discernible from its design."6 9 Within the parameters of this test,
elements that are separable from the building's function receive full copyright
protection as sculptural works,' 70 while the AWCPA provides only limited protection
to the remaining portions. 7' In essence, the public may legally photograph the
buildings functional portions, "'72 but not its decorative elements. 73 One commentator
illustrated this anomaly by noting that iunder such a scheme, a tourist is free to
photograph the Notre Dame in Paris, but not the famous gargoyles attached to the
Cathedral.'74 This example typifies one difficulty created by the pictorial
representation exception. This illustration, however, is not an entirely accurate
description of the state of the law. The courts have created an exception to the artist's
copyright protection, known as the "fair use" doctrine.'75
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine limits the breadth of copyright law, balancing the artists'
pecuniary interests against the public's interest in free use of the work.7" If the
169. See COPYRIGH-r OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at xviii-xx (discussing four different
applications of conceptual separability).
170. VARA, supra note 163. In addition to the exclusive rights to make and distribute
copies and derivative works of a copyrighted work, the VARA moral rights provisions apply to
works of visual art. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. The statutory definition of a "work of visual art"
includes sculptures, drawings (except technical drawings), paintings, prints, and, in some cases,
photographs. Id. § 101.
171. See supra notes 126-141 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on copyright
protection of architectural works under AWCPA).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). The copyright in a constructed architectural work does not include
the right to prevent the public from making, distributing, or publicly displaying pictures,
paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work. Id. This provision,
however, applies only if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily
visible from a public place. Id.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). The 1976 Act expressly grants the copyright owner the exclusive
right to make derivative copies of the protected work. Id.
174. See Winick, supra note 8, at 1627 (illustrating application of AWCPA and VARA to
different elements of one structure).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Copying protected works for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is considered fair use of the work, and
therefore not a copyright infringement. Id. To determine whether a purported infringement
constitutes fair use, the courts are to consider four factors. Id. First, they are to assess the
purpose and character of the use. Id. Second, the courts are to look at the nature of the
copyrighted work. Id. Third, they are to determine the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. Id. Finally, they are to consider the effect
of the infringing use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Id.
176. SeeNew Era Publications Infl v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir.
1988) (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (stating that fair use must serve public interest required use of
original work must outweigh author's pecuniary interests); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061,
1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that fair use doctrine balances exclusive rights of copyright holder
with public's interest in information affecting areas of universal concern such as art, science,
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publics interest outweighs that of the copyright owner, there is no infringement of the
owner's copyright. 17 For example, copying for purposes such as criticism, news
reporting, teaching or research weigh heavily in favor of the free use of copyrighted
material.17 Although the fair use doctrine must be applied on a case-by-case basis,
79
courts have held that fair use allows copying protected works for private use.'
Therefore, a tourist photographing the Notre Dame gargoyles for her personal use
would not infringe the artist's copyright.'' This holds true even though the copyright
history, or industry), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978); Wainright See., Inc. v. Wall Street
Transcript Co., 558 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding fair use doctrine offers means of
balancing exclusive rights of copyright holder with public's interest in dissemination of
information). The fair use doctrine distinguishes between a "true scholar" and "chiseler who
infringes a work for personal profit." Id. See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the
Law of Copyrght,45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,533 (1945) (explaining fair use of protected works
requires discerning advantages that public derives from copy and weighing those advantages
against author's interests).
177. GoRmAN & GINSBURG, supra note 9, at 548. The traditional concept of fair use
excused reasonable unauthorized appropriations from an original work. Id. See Rosemont
Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding courts must
subordinate copyright holder's interest in maximum financial return to greater public interest in
development of art, science and industry), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). The courts have
evolved a set of criteria which provides guidelines for balancing the interests of the copyright
bwner with those of the public. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976)
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5670. These criteria can essentially all be reduced to the
four standards which Congress adopted in the 1976 Act, including the purpose and character
of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating non-exclusive list of purposes for which fair use
exemption may apply).
179. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990). The fair use doctrine permits and
requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute. Id. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (Holding that fair use is not
to be simplified with bright line rules, but calls for case-by-case analysis).
180. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,449-50 (1984)
(holding that home videotaping is fair use); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
780 F. Supp. 1283,1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding private home use of video game accessory
was presumptively fair for purpose of determining whether use infringed copyrights for video
game cartridges), affid, 964 F.2d 965 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
181. Id. The tourist in the above illustration photographed the gargoyles for her own use.
Applying Congress' test in 17 U.S.C. § 107, the court would first look to the purpose and
character of the use, includingwhether such use is of a commercial nature. Id. In this example,
the use is not a commercial use and not for profit, weighing in favor of fair use. Universal City
Studios v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica, 464 U.S. 417,449 (1984). The second factor, the nature of
the copyrighted work, also weighs in favor of fair use because it is a sculptural work located in
a highly visible public place. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
Although the third consideration - the amount of the copyrighted work taken - may weigh
against fair use, the final factor is given the most weight. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50. The courts
are to look to the effect the use has upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
27
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law fully protects the gargoyles," both domestically and intemationally.'
C. United States Compliance With International Law
By enacting the AWCPA, Congress purported to comply with its international
obligations arising from the Berne Convention.8 4 However, the Berne Convention's
minimum standards require that the copyright owner hold the exclusive right to
reproduce protected works in any medium."5 In addition, the Berne Convention
requires that copyright protection extend to the exclusive right of adaptation"8 for all
protected works, including architectural works."s Furthermore, the terms of the Berne
work. Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). Arguably, the only
impact such photographs would have on the pecuniary interests of the artist would be lost
royalties of the sale of those photographs. The photographer in the above illustration had very
little impact on the pecuniary interests of the artist, and, thus, probably did not infringe the
artist's copyright. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994).
Although it is ultimately a matter for the courts, public interests and difficulties in enforcing the
artist's rights would likely greatly outweigh the artist's pecuniary interests, and therefore
constitute "fair use." For a general discussion of applying the fair use doctrine, see Campbell,
114 S.Ct. and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (1994). See also
supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing private use as qualifying for fair use
exemption to copyright infringement).
182. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text (discussing VARA). In the United
States, the Visual Artists Rights Act offers full copyright protection, including moral rights, to
visual arts (such as gargoyles). Id.
183. Beme Convention Text, supra note 84. The Berne Convention also recognizes fair
use of protected works. Id. art. 10(1). The Berne Convention applies the doctrine through a
three-prong test. WIPO GuDE TO THm BERNE CONvENTION, supra note 85, at 58-59. If one
reproduces a protected work under a claim of fair use, the court will determine whether the
infringing use is compatible with, and only to the extent justified by, fair practice. Id. In
deciding fairness, the courts consider the extent to which the infringing work, by competing
with the original, cuts in upon the original artist's pecuniary interests. Id.
184. See 136 CoNG. REc. E259 (daily ed. Febrbary 7, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) (stating that AWCPA was designed to place United States "unequivocally in
compliance" with its Berne Convention obligations).
185. See Berne Convention Text, supra note 84 at art. 9 (providing authors and artists
exclusive right to reproduce protected works, "in any manner or form").
186. See id. at art. 12 (providing authors and artists exclusive right to authorize adaptations
of protected works).
187. See id. at art. 2(1) (defining "literary and artistic works" as including architectural
works and illustrations, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to architecture).
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Convention do not allow signatories to make reservations' to the treaty'89 Upon
ratifying the treaty,'90 then;the United States pledged to adhere, without exception, to
each of the Convention's terms.' 9'
Contrary to the Berne Convention's requirements, the pictorial representation
exception deprives architects of the exclusive right to make and to sell copies of
copyrighted architectural works." Although Congress enacted the AWCPA to bring
the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention's terms,'93 the Act fails
188. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doe. A/Conf. 39/27, art. 2, d, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The
Vienna Convention defines a reservation as a "unilateral statement" made by a country when
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain
provisions as they apply to that country. Id.
189. Berne Convention Text, supra note 84. Excepting four situations in which parties to
the Berne Convention may make reservations, the Treaty otherwise prohibits them. Id. at art.
30(1). Two of the four exceptions are applicable only to countries who were members of the
Berne Convention at the time of the Paris revisions of 1971. Id. art. 30(2) and art. 28(1)(b).
Another applies to the settlement of disputes between member countries. Id. art. 33(2). The
last contains special rles for developing countries. Id. at Appendix. None are applicable to the
United States. Id.
In addition, a "minor reservation" exemption to the Berne Convention, intended to act as an
exemption to the exclusive rights of public performance (Articles 11, 11's, and 11"'), recording
musical works (Article 13), and cinematographic rights (Article 14), WIPO GtnnE TO THE
BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 85, at 65, allows some exceptions to the exclusive right of
adaptation. See Belanger, supra note 22, at 396 n.184 (discussing minor reservation
exemption). The minor reservation exemption covers gratuitous performances given by popular
societies, military bands, students and the like. Id. This reservation exemption does not apply
to architectural works, WIPO GUIDE TO THm BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 85, at 65, and
therefore does not encompass the U.S. exception, 17 U.S.C. § 120(a), for making two-
dimensional reproductions of architectural works. See also Berne Convention Text, supra note
84, at art. 12 (stating that authors shall enjoy exclusive right to exploit derivative works
produced from original work).
190. SAM RiCKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 123 (1987). The Director General of the World International
Property Organization formally accepted the United States' Notice of Adherence to the Berne
Convention on March 1, 1989. Id.
191. Vienna Convention, supra note 188, at art. 26. One of the most fundamental
principles of international law ispacta sunt servanda: every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. LINDAA. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 18 (1995) [hereinafter IrTERNATiONAL LAW]. Although the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention, the State Department recognizes it as the authoritative guide to current
treaty law and practice. Id. at 4.
192. Compare supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text (discussing copyright protection
for architectural works required by terms of Berne Convention) with supra notes 133-149 and
accompanying text (discussing copyright protection offered by AWCPA).
193. See, e.g., Wargo, supra note 63, at 407 nn. 18-19 (stating that purpose of AWCPA was
to increase U.S. copyright protection for architectural works to comply with minimum
requirements ofBerne Convention). Congress sought to provide architectural works with only
the minimum protection required to comply with the Berne Convention. Id.
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to do so. Consequently, the failure of Congress to provide architects the exclusive
right to reproduce their works is inconsistent with the terms of the Berne Convention
and, therefore, a violation of international law.'94 There are, however, two arguments
refuting this conclusion.
Proponents of one position argue that the Copyright Act of 1976 conformed
substantially to the Berne Convention's requirements.'95 They believe that the
copyright law adequately protected notable architectural works as sculptural works."
To support this position, they rely on the World Intellectual Property Organization's
(WIPO) 97 acceptance of the United States as a signatory to the Berne Convention
based upon the copyright protection provided under the 1976 Act.'
Under international law, a treaty creates international legal obligations. "
Therefore, when a country ratifies a treaty, that country manifests its intent to abide by
the treaty's terms.2"e Acceptance in a multilateral treaty is not recognition of existing
compliance,' but rather, it is acknowledgment of a country's consent to abide by the
treaty's terms. 202 Accordingly, that the WIPO accepted the United States' articles of
ratification is not evidence that the United States was in compliance with the Berne
194. See Stat. of the I.C.J., art. 38, l(a) (stating that international conventions, whether
general or particular, establish rules expressly recognized by consenting nations).
195. COPYIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 215. Representative Kastenmeier,
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice, suggested that the protection afforded architectural works under the 1976 Copyright Act
was sufficient to meet the minimum standards of the Berne Convention. Berne Convention
Hearings, supra note 105, at 689. The testimony of Professor Paul Goldstein and former
Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer in earlier House hearings influenced Representative
Kastenmeier to adopt this position. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 216.
196. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 208-20 (discussing architectural
works as qualifying for copyright protection as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works under 1976
Act).
197. See Berne Convention Text, supra note 84, at arts. 23-26 (establishing criteria for
WIPO). The World Intellectual Property Organization is the international association
responsible for administering the Berne Convention. Id.
198. See, e.g., Bucher, supra note 12, at 1285 (stating that WIPO judged 1976 Act
sufficient to allow U.S. to join Convention, and questioning why previous copyright law is
inadequate to fulfill requirements of Berne Convention).
199. See BARRYE. CARTER& PELLIPR. TRvMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (2d ed. 1995)
(defining treaty).
200. See Vienna Convention, supra note 188, at art. 46-52 (stating that treaties are
expression of consent to be bound by international agreement).
201. See U.N. CHARM pmbl. (declaring that obligations arise from international treaties).
202. See Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in
International Relations, NETH. Y.B. INT L L. 65, 67 (1982) (stating that treaty is created by
corresponding declarations of countries expressing their consent to be so bound); Marian Nash,
InternationalActs not ConstitutingAgreements, 88 AM. J. INTL L. 515, 517 (1994) (quoting
internal United States State Department Memorandum indicating parties "must intend their
undertakings to be legally binding" in order to constitute international agreement).
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Convention. Furthermore, after concluding an extensive study,203 the U.S. Copyright
Office conceded that copyright protection offered to architectural works failed to meet
the United States' Berne Convention obligations.2°4
Others argue that the Beme Convention allows the pictorial representation
exception because an international ad hoe committee has endorsed the position taken
by the United States.25 In creating guidelines for conforming with the Berne
Convention, a joint WIPO/United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) committee drafted a Model Copyright Law for member
nations.2" One preliminary draft principle interpreted the Berne Convention as
allowing pictorial representations of architectural works.0 7 Because of this
preliminaiy interpretation, some commentators believe that the pictorial representation
exception is an acceptable deviation from the Berne Convention's terms.2's
Interpreting the treaty's terms, however, is not within the WIPO's authority or that
of any other ad hoc committee.2" Signatories must interpret a treaty according to its
terms' ordinary meanings.21 Member nations may resort to supplementary means of
203. See generally COPYRIGHT OFFIcE REPORT, supra note 51 (conducting general inquiry
into scope and nature of copyright protection for works of architecture).
204. Id. at 220-23.
205. See Wargo, supra note 63, at 439 (discussing findings of WIPO/UNESCO committee).
In October 1986, a WIPO/UNESCO committee of governmental experts met in Geneva to
evaluate and synthesize principles for appropriate copyright protection for works of architecture.
Id.
206. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 148 (stating that in late 1980's,
WIPO/UNESCO ad hoc committee formulated draft principles for Model Copyright Law).
207. Id. at 150. Principle WA7 of the WIPO/UNESCO Draft Model Copyright Law
specifies that the authoe's permission is not required to reproduce the external images of publicly
located works of architecture by photography, drawing, cinematography, or other similar
methods. Id. This exemption applies whether the copy was made for private or commercial
purposes. Id.
208. See, e.g., Wargo, supra note 63, at 443-44 (discussing WIPO/UNESCO committee's
views on reproduction of works of architecture as justification for pictorial representation
exception).
209. INTrMION ILAw, supra note 191, at 19. There are three basic approaches to treaty
interpretation. The first, advocated by the Institute of International Law, looks only to the text
of the treaty and the "plain and natural meaning of the words." Id. The second approach,
incorporated into articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention, looks first to the text, then to the
intent of the parties. Id. Subsequent agreements, subsequent practices, and other relevant rules
of international law may indicate the intent of the parties. Id. The last approach, to which no
intemational organization subscribes, interprets the terms of a treaty by the intent of the parties,
as gleaned form the text of the treaty and all pre- and post-treaty communications. Id.
210. Vienna Conventionsupra note 188, at art. 31-32. A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith according to the ordinary meaning of the terms. Id. at art. 31. Supplementary means of
interpretation, including preparatory work, may be considered only when the plain meaning of
the term is obscure or renders the agreement manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Id. at art. 32.
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interpretation11 only when the ordinary meaning of the term or clause is ambiguous
or obscure." 2 Under the ordinary meaning of the Berne Convention's terms,
architectural works should receive the same copyright protection as other protected
works."' Whether failure to do so violates the treaty, and therefore international law,
is a question for the Berne Convention's signatories.214 Congress, however, could
easily avoid this issue by eliminating the pictorial representation exception of the
AWCPA.215
D. A Proposed Solution
In creating the pictorial representation exception, Congress attempted to eliminate
the legal ambiguities of the fair use doctrine.21 6 Congress theorized that it did not have
211. See Stat. of the I.C.J., art 38, 1 (d) (defining subsidiary means for determining rules
of international law). The WIPO/UNESCO Draft Model Copyright Law is most likely a
supplementary means of interpretation. Id.
212. Vienna Convention, supra note 188, at art. 32.
213. Berne Convention Text, supra note 84. Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention provides
that member nations shall protect all works, including "every production in the literary,
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode orform of its expression, such as..
. works of... architecture.. .. " Id. at art. 2(1) (emphasis added). The framers of the Berne
Convention intended its wording to include all works capable of protection. WIPO GUIDE TO
THE BER.,E CONVENTION, supra note 85, at 13. The clause covering works of architecture
includes virtually all artistic works, whether two dimensional or three, independent of their
nature or their purpose. Id. at 16.
214. Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice, 178 REC. DEs CouRs
111-21 (1982), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTE, & PHaLi, R. TRnvmLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
118-19 (2d ed. 1995). A country believing itself to be a victim of a treaty violation isjustified
in using all means permissible under international law to cause a cessation of that violation and
to obtain reparation. Id. One such means is to have the case heard by the International Court
of Justice. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 36.
Nations adhering to the Berne Convention have not reached unanimous consent as to
whether the treaty allows architects to control two-dimensional reproductions of their works.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 165-93. For example, Denmark, Finland, and
Cyprus permit two-dimensional reproductions of architectural works. Id. Belgium, Germany,
and France do not, although Germany makes an exception for architectural works located on
public roads and Belgium makes an exception for two-dimensional reproductions necessary for
reporting of public events. Id.
215. See supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text (discussing pictorial representation
exception as violation of international law). By eliminating the pictorial representation exception
to the AWCPA, Congress would eliminate one area of potential non-compliance with the terms
of the Berne Convention. Id.
216. See Michael E. Scholl, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990:
A Solution or a Hindrance?, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 807, 819 (1992) (stating that Congress
based pictorial representation limitation on policy of classifying architecture as public art form).
Congress! other reasons included that it would rather provide an express exemption to copyright
than rely on the doctrine of fair use as a defense to infringement. Id.
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to protect two-dimensional representations" 7 to provide architects with the economic
incentives for creativity.218 The exception, however, created international and
domestic legal ambiguities and inconsistent copyright policies that far outweighed the
stated purpose of avoiding the fair use doctrine."9 Therefore, by amending the
copyright law to provide architects with the exclusive right to control all forms of their
works' reproduction, Congress would provide a benefit to architects, the courts and the
public?'  As demonstrated, the pictorial representation exception is unduly
burdensome, and Congress should eliminate it.
Besides bringing the United States into compliance with its Berne Convention
obligations, eliminating the exception would reduce the need to categorize structures
as architectural works or sculptural works. Despite the similarity of the works,22' there
217. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 51, at 76-77. By eliminating pictorial
representations from the scope of copyright protection, Congress finally took a position on this
controversial issue. Id. The debate over the ability to photograph buildings in the United States
began as early as 1906. Id. This issue derailed the initial discussions of adding architectural
works to the legislation that eventually became the Copyright Act of 1909. Id.
218. SeeAWCPA Hearings; supra note 105, at 70-71 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register
of Copyrights) (discussing reasons why Congress should not establish full copyright protection
for architectural works).
219. Compare supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text (discussing purposes for
pictorial representation exception) W'th supra notes 218-219 and accompanying text (discussing
ambiguities created by pictorial representation exception).
220. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 n.10
(1984) (stating that Congress' enactment of copyright legislation confers benefit upon public that
outweighs evils of temporary monopoly); Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996 WL 54741, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (stating that
copyright law is derived from Framers' conviction that secure economic incentive to individuals
is best way to stimulate development of "Science and useful Arts" to ultimate benefit of general
public); Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429,435 (C. D. Cal., 1979)
(stating that Copyright Act is premised on belief that the public will benefit when authors are
given exclusive rights leading to economic reward and encouragement for continued
contribution to arts and sciences); see also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802
F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that copyright law "celebrates the profit motive,
recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the
public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge") (emphasis in original).
221. See HOUsE REPoT 101-735, supra note 117, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,
6951 (discussing what Congress meant by the term "building"). Recognizing the difficulty in
using the term "building" as used in the AWCPA, the legislative history attempts to refine the
definition of architectural works. Id. Congress determined that the term "building"
encompasses structures that human beings use and inhabit, such as houses, office buildings,
gazebos, and garden pavilions. Id. See also Regulations of the U.S. Copyright Office, 37
C.F.R. § 202.11(bX2) (1991) (defining "building" as permanent and stationary humanly
habitable structure).
The legislative history, however, restricts the definition of "building" to exclude "bridges and
related nonhabitable three-dimensional structures" from protection. HousE REPoRT 101-735,
supra note 117, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935,6951. See also Regulations of the U.S.
Copyright Office, 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 (dX 1) (1991) (stating that structures other than buildings
are not proper subject ofcopyright). These exclusions raise the question of how an architect can
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is a vast diffeance between the protection copyright law offers sculptural works' and
that which the AWCPA offers architectural works. Furthermore, it is unclear whether
copyright law offers copyright protection for purely aesthetic features incorporated in
architectural structures as sculptural works.' Assuming it does, Congress has
reintroduced the problem of classifying an architectural work as either functional or
nonfunctional, useful or aesthetic." Given the difficulty courts have historically had
with this distinction, the pictorial representation exception has not significantly
clarified copyright law as it applies to architectural works. Allowing the copyright
owner to control pictorial representations of protected works would more closely align
the AWCPA with the protection Congress has granted for pictorial, sculptural and
graphic works. Accordihgly, it would greatly reduce the significance of deciding
which Act provides protection for a particular work.2" Eliminating the pictorial
representation exception would also abrogate the current anomaly that one may
know whether a work is categorized as a protected architectural work or as an unprotected
"nonhabitable three-dimensional structure." Vanessa N. Scaglione, Building Upon the
Architectural Workr Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 193, 197 (1992).
Under these guidelines, it is impossible to determine whether structures that blur the distinction
between a "building" and a nonhabitable structure will qualify as architecture or sculpture, or
as an unprotected structure. Id. at 198.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Authors of sculptural works enjoy the exclusive right to reproduce
the sculpture in copies and derivative works, and the exclusive right to authorize distribution of
those copies. Id. Furthermore, the Visual Artists Rights Act provides moral rights for visual
artists, including a paternity right and a right of integrity. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 6915.
This Act marks the first express federal statutory recognition of moral rights under U.S. law.
Id. Section 106A of the Act confers the rights of attribution and integrity to the copyright
owner. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993). The right of attribution includes the right to claim
authorship, and the right to prevent the false designation of authorship. Id. § 106A(1). The
author has the right to prevent the use of his name on a work that another has distorted,
mutilated, or modified in a manner prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. Id. § 106A(2).
The integrity right allows the author to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification that may be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation. Id. § 106A(3). The
author also has the right to prevent the destruction of a work "of recognized stature." Id. §
106A(3)(b).
When a structure is a w&k of visual art, or a work of visual art has been incorporated into
a building in a way that removing the work from the building would cause its destruction, the
Visual Artists Rights Act protects that work. Id. § 1 13(d)(1XA)-(B). The owner of a building
who wishes to remove a work of visual art that is part of the building must notify the artist of
the owner's intended action. Id.
With respect to architectural works protected by the AWCPA, the owner of a building
embodying that work may authorize or make alterations to the building, and destroy the
building, without the consent of the copyright owner. Id. §
120(b).
223. See Scaglione, supra note 221, at 202 (discussing works that have both sculptural and
architectural aspects).
224. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (discussing conceptual separability).
225. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text (comparing copyright protection
provided sculptural works with that provided under AWCPA).
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photograph a building, but not the decorative art applied to it, or incorporated within
it.2
6
Finally, the AWCPA denies the architect of viable market interests 27 Commercial
representations of architectural works are a potentially lucrative source of secondary
income on notable works.2 8 However, Congress has decided that since this is not a
normal exploitation of the work, copyright law need not entitle architects to control
two-dimensional reproductions of their works.229 Congressional reasons for depriving
an architect of the income from two-dimensional souvenirs, but allowing him to profit
from commercially produced three-dimensional souvenirs are dubious." A better
solution would be to prohibit two-dimensional reproductions, and to rely on the
Copyright Act's fair use provision to prevent only commercial exploitation.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the United States has provided very little copyright protection for
architectural works. However, influenced by the Berne Convention, United States
copyright law is slowly evolving to reflect international expectations. The AWCPA
was a necessary step in that evolution.'
The evolution, however, is not complete. The AWCPA fails to bring the United
States into compliance with the Berne Convention. As the pictorial representation
exception applies only to two-dimensional works, the AWCPA arbitrarily restricts the
architect's right to control derivative works. Because the architect no longer has
exclusive control of those works, the copyright law deprives her of a significant
portion of her market interest. Also, because the AWCPA permits pictorial
representations of a building but not applied decorative art, the courts still must apply
the fair use doctrine to excuse many potential copyright infringements. Finally,
because the Visual Artists Rights Act covers sculptural works, architects creating
nonfunctional architecture enjoy considerably more protection than those creating
useful architectural works. This dichotomy reintroduces the problem of classifying
226. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text (discussing ability to photograph
works protected by AWCPA but not works protected by VARA).
227. SeeAWCPA Hearings; supra note 105, at 138 (statement of Richard Carney on behalf
of the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation) (noting that commercial uses of models and photographs
of architectural works deprive architects of fruits of their labor without compensation).
228. See supra notes 148 & 157-158 and accompanying text (discussing marketability of
two- and three-dimensional reproductions of architectural works); Winick, supra note 8, at 1626
(stating that substantial market exists for derivative works representing notable architectural
works).
229. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text (discussing congressional view that
allowing pictorial representations does not interfere with architects' normal exploitation of
architectural works).
230. See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text (discussing congressional reasons for
pictorial representation exception).
231. See 136 CONG. REc. E259 (daily ed. February 7, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) (introducing Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act in House of
Representatives, discussing Act and purposes for its implementation).
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structures as either functional or aesthetic, and providing significantly different
protection based on this determination?
2
Congress could easily resolve four of these anomalies, and alleviate the last, by
eliminating the pictorial representation exception. Such action would resolve the
question of compliance with the Berne Convention requirements because United
States law would grant copyright protection to all reproductions of protected works.
Additionally, there would no longer be significant differences between the treatment
of two-dimensional and three-dimensional reproductions of architectural works.
Architects would enjoy the exclusive right to all market interests that they might have
in their works. Architectural works would be subject to the fair use doctrine, just as
are all other subjects of copyright law. The difference between rights to granted an
architectural work would not be significantly different from those granted to a
sculptural work.
The fair use doctrine adequately protects the purposes for which Congress enacted
the pictorial representation exception. Architects should receive the same copyright
protection as that enjoyed by other artists. 3 The resulting increase in copyright
protection will maximize public welfare by encouraging the individual efforts of
creative designers rather than promote the interests of subsequent copiers.
232. See supra notes 159-171 & 221-224 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties
created in applications of conceptual separability test).
233. HOUSEREPORT 101-735,supra note 117, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935. The
design of an architectural work is a "writing" under the Constitution and deserves full protection
under the Copyright Act. Id. Architecture is an art form that performs a very public, social
purpose and, as a work of art, plays a central role in our daily lives. Id. Ada Louise Huxtable,
an architecture critic, compared architecture to poetry, explaining that architects can make
"poetry out of visual devices, as a writer uses literary or aural devices. As words become
symbols, so do objects; the architectural world is an endless source of symbols with unique
ramifications in time and space." A. Rossi, MEMORY AND METAPHOR IN ARC-ITECTURE
ANYONE? 45-46 (1986). See also Hearing on Architectural Design Protection Before the
Subcomm. on Court, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. at 136 (1990) (statement of Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation) (testifying that architecture is no less an art form than sculpture or painting); id. at
49 (statement of Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman) (testifying that architecture is one of
world's oldest and most revered forms of art).
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